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Imagine that you are walking to the mail room of your 
place of employment when you suddenly experience 
excruciating burning in your arms emanating from your 
shoulder and neck. What could be the cause of the pain? 
You remember tweaking your arms and elbows earlier 
that morning when catching a trash can awkwardly to 
keep it from hitting the ground. Could the pain be due to 
wrestling the trash can? Did you rupture a disk, pinch a 
nerve, or just exacerbate your carpal-tunnel disease? 
Alternatively, are your symptoms explainable by some-
thing potentially more serious? Is it a heart attack? Feeling 
a little off, you decide to drive yourself to the hospital just 
in case. Although you never felt heart pain or pressure in 
your chest, a few hours later it is confirmed: You are suf-
fering from a heart blockage and in imminent danger of 
suffering a heart attack.
Diagnostic reasoning of the sort described above is a 
common occurrence. We observe data or information in 
our environment, and we generate likely explanations of 
those data (hypotheses). In many situations, the actions 
we take and the decisions we make depend on the out-
come of the hypothesis-generation process. In some 
cases, our lives depend on these processes, and in other 
cases, such as medical diagnosis, the lives of others do 
(Elstein, Shulman, Sprafka, & Allal, 1978). Hypothesis-
generation processes are pervasive and occur in tasks 
ranging from mundane (e.g., predicting what might hap-
pen next on your favorite TV show) to life-and-death 
(e.g., medical diagnosis). The question addressed in this 
article concerns the underlying cognitive processes: What 
impact does hypothesis generation have on the choices 
we make, the way we search for information, and how 
likely we judge different causal explanations?
Memory and Hypothesis Generation
In the opening example, the few explanations consid-
ered for the arm pain were dredged up from experience 
or memory. You remembered hitting your arm that morn-
ing, you reflected on your experiences with carpal tun-
nel, and you called up what you knew about heart 
attacks. Our work has focused on how memory con-
strains hypothesis generation and downstream decision 
making. Figure 1 depicts a general theoretical framework 
for hypothesis generation. This framework assumes that 
there are three primary processes involved: retrieval 
(retrieving memories from storage), maintenance (sus-
taining retrieved hypotheses in consciousness), and judg-
ment (making decisions).
Retrieval from memory operates when information in 
the environment (e.g., symptoms of a patient) prompt 
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the recovery of associated hypotheses from experience 
and memory. Returning to the opening example, if you 
made it to the hospital after experiencing arm pain, we 
assume that your symptoms would prompt the physician 
to retrieve diagnostic hypotheses from long-term mem-
ory. One such hypothesis might be heartburn. Another 
might be some kind of blockage or heart attack. Once 
hypotheses are retrieved, they are maintained in an active 
state in working memory. In other words, you keep 
hypotheses mentally handy so that you can compare 
them to the available data and target the most likely 
explanation. The ability to maintain data (e.g., 
symptoms) and hypotheses (e.g., diseases) has been 
found to differ between individuals, such that people 
who have lower working memory capacity behave as 
though they maintain fewer hypotheses in working mem-
ory (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a).
Importantly, only hypotheses actively maintained in 
working memory seem to influence the downstream 
 processes involved in judgment (Dougherty, Thomas, & 
Lange, 2010; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 
2008). For example, probability judgments—how likely 
you think each option is—appear to be calculated on the 
basis of a comparison of a “focal” hypothesis with the 
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Fig. 1. A general theoretical framework for hypothesis generation. In this example, a diagnostician processes information contained in a radio-
graphic slide and generates possible hypotheses to explain the presenting symptoms and visual patterns contained in the x-ray. The diagnostician 
can use the hypotheses maintained in working memory to render a probability judgment that the patient is suffering from a particular disease, via 
the comparison process. Alternatively, the hypotheses maintained in working memory can be fed back into the search process to help guide the 
diagnostician’s search for cues within the x-ray or to inform decisions concerning which medical tests it would be most informative to order.
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alternative hypotheses that are active in working mem-
ory. For example, your physician’s probability judgment 
that your symptoms are the result of appendicitis will 
differ depending on the quality and the number of alter-
native diagnoses being actively considered. Comparing 
appendicitis to only a single low-quality alternative diag-
noses (e.g., a brain tumor) will make appendicitis seem 
more likely to your physician than comparing appendici-
tis to several higher-quality alternative diagnoses (e.g., 
indigestion, gallbladder disease, hernia, cracked ribs). 
Similarly, the composition of the set of hypotheses being 
actively maintained is used to identify the relevant infor-
mation to search (e.g., medical tests) to test the validity of 
particular hypotheses—a notion we refer to as hypothe-
sis-guided search. These relations between hypothesis 
generation and decision processes imply a dependence 
of decision making on memory—a dependence that we 
have explored in some detail.
Because the various memory processes underlying 
hypothesis generation and decision making interact in 
complex ways, it is useful to instill these processes in cog-
nitive models. Cognitive models allow researchers to study 
the implications of their theoretical assumptions and the 
complex interactions among processes by observing the 
behavior of the model. Thomas et al. (2008) developed a 
cognitive model (HyGene, short for “hypothesis genera-
tion”) of hypothesis generation that allows exploration of 
these complex interactions while also providing a mecha-
nistic account of human decision-making behavior.
Memory Processes Constrain 
Hypothesis Generation
A wide variety of reasoning tasks involve hypothesis gen-
eration. For any given task, including diagnosing the 
cause of arm pain, there are a large number of possible 
causal diagnoses. Yet, with some regularity, participants 
and professionals tend to generate only a small subset of 
these hypotheses (Dougherty, Gettys, & Thomas, 1997; 
Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a; Gettys & Fisher, 1979; Mehle, 
1982; Weber, Böckenholt, Hilton, & Wallace, 1993). The 
HyGene model accounts for this phenomenon by assum-
ing that newly retrieved hypotheses are explicitly gener-
ated only if they are better matches to the data than the 
poorest-matching hypothesis in working memory. 
Failures in this process characterize profound examples 
of mental illness—like entertaining the hypothesis that 
the kitchen faucet is communicating with you when the 
dripping is perfectly consistent with its just being leaky. 
At the same time, the HyGene model predicts that the 
most likely hypotheses will be generated first, another 
prediction consistent with the literature (Dougherty et al., 
1997; Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a; Sprenger & Dougherty, 
2012; Weber et al., 1993). The HyGene model assumes 
this result because hypotheses that have occurred more 
often in a person’s experience are more prevalent in 
long-term memory, which results in greater activations of 
hypotheses with higher a priori likelihood. In turn, the 
more activated hypotheses are more likely to be gener-
ated from long-term memory into working memory.
Hypothesis Generation Affects 
Probability Judgment
Your physician might tell you that there is a 42% chance 
(a .42 probability) of your dying from (any type of) can-
cer. But if pressed further, he or she might tell you that 
the probability of your dying from breast cancer, lung 
cancer, or colon cancer is .18, .15, and .17, whose sum is 
greater than the previously stated probability of dying 
from any type of cancer—this effect is typically labeled 
subadditivity. Subadditivity obtains when the probability 
assigned to an implicit disjunction (e.g., dying from any 
type of cancer) is exceeded by the sum of probabilities 
assigned to the explicit disjunction (e.g., breast cancer, 
lung cancer, or colon cancer).
The probability-judgment task given above is often 
characterized as involving a comparison process, wherein 
the strength of evidence for one hypothesis (breast can-
cer) is compared with the strength of evidence for the 
alternatives (lung cancer and colon cancer; Tversky & 
Koehler, 1994). Implementing this comparison process in 
HyGene (Fig. 1) enables the model to make clear predic-
tions about subadditivity: All else being equal, the fewer 
hypotheses that one includes in the comparison process, 
the higher the probability assigned to each one. When 
summed across all judged hypotheses, this naturally 
leads to the prediction of subadditivity.
Individual Differences in Working 
Memory Capacity and Divided 
Attention Affect Hypothesis 
Generation and Probability Judgment
Subadditivity has been found in many studies investigat-
ing probability judgments (e.g., Dougherty & Hunter, 
2003a, 2003b; Dougherty & Sprenger, 2006; Tversky & 
Koehler, 1994). However, the level of subadditivity is 
dependent on memory variables. For example, Dougherty 
and Hunter (2003a, 2003b) showed that the magnitude of 
subadditivity was correlated with working memory 
capacity. This finding is consistent with the notion of a 
capacity-limited comparison process (as demonstrated by 
the HyGene simulations illustrated in Fig. 2). In other 
words, individuals with low working memory capacity 
were unable to maintain as many alternatives for inclu-
sion in the comparison process as individuals with high 
working memory capacity, leading them to make exces-
sive probability judgments.
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The HyGene model assumes that variables that con-
strain the generation process or reduce working memory 
capacity will lead to increases in judged probability 
because fewer hypotheses will be available to the com-
parison process, leading to excessive probability judg-
ments. For instance, if you are making probability 
judgments while also trying to remember a list of letters, 
chances are good that you are going to assign higher 
probabilities to each outcome because you will not be 
considering as many alternative hypotheses to begin 
with. Consistent with these intuitions and with the 
HyGene model’s predictions (Fig. 2), Sprenger et  al. 
(2011) found that participants’ probability judgments 
were higher when they were experiencing higher levels 
of cognitive load (resulting in greater subadditivity)—
providing additional evidence that the comparison pro-
cess for probability judgments is capacity limited.
Hypothesis Generation Influences 
Hypothesis-Testing Behavior
Hypothesis testing involves searching for or selecting 
information in order to test the truth of a hypothesis. A 
common finding in the literature is that of confirmatory 
search (for a review, see Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Kardes, 
& Mantel, 1998), whereby people select information rel-
evant for evaluating only a single hypothesis (Klayman & 
Ha, 1987). For instance, a physician who thinks a patient 
might be suffering from appendicitis might check for ten-
derness in the abdomen. Although there might be a high 
likelihood of yielding a positive result of abdominal ten-
derness if the patient has appendicitis, this confirming 
test could still be nondiagnostic or uninformative for 
revising beliefs. For instance, if competing hypotheses 
(e.g., gallbladder disease, cracked ribs) have likelihoods 
of yielding a positive result of abdominal tenderness that 
are similar to that of appendicitis, then the test is uninfor-
mative. A diagnostic test would be one in which the like-
lihood of a positive result differs between competing 
hypotheses (e.g., an elevated white-blood-cell count 
might be highly likely for appendicitis, but relatively 
unlikely for cracked ribs), providing the potential for 
revising beliefs about relevant hypotheses. Although 
some recent work has argued that confirmation testing 
can be a reasonable strategy once the complexity of real-
world domains is accounted for (Dougherty et al., 2010; 
Navarro & Perfors, 2011), diagnostic search has been 
observed under conditions that facilitate the consider-
ation of alternatives (Mynatt, Doherty, & Dragan, 1993).
The HyGene model assumes that decision makers 
search for information contingent on their currently held 
hypotheses (i.e., they engage in hypothesis-guided 
search; Dougherty et al., 2010; Thomas et al., 2008). If 
only one hypothesis is maintained in working memory, 
then hypothesis-guided search necessarily follows a con-
firmation-search strategy, which can lead to the selection 
of uninformative tests. However, if more than one hypoth-
esis is in working memory, then the decision maker can 
search diagnostically. We argue that retrieving alternative 
hypotheses into working memory enables decision mak-
ers to prefer diagnostic tests (Dougherty et  al., 2010; 
Thomas et al., 2008).
Thomas, Lange, and Dougherty (as cited in Lange et al., 
in press) tested the effects of self-generated hypotheses on 
information search. After a learning phase in 
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Fig. 2. HyGene simulation demonstrating the effects of working memory capacity and cogni-
tive load on probability judgment (left) and hypothesis generation (right). Note that the HyGene 
parameter governing working memory capacity accounts for low working memory capacity due to 
individual differences or the presence of a secondary task (i.e., high cognitive load). Adapted from 
“Diagnostic Hypothesis Generation and Human Judgment,” by R. P. Thomas, M. R.  Dougherty, 
A. M. Sprenger, and J. Harbison, 2008, Psychological Review, 115, p. 174. Copyright 2008 by the 
American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.
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which participants gained experience with particular 
symptom-disease associations, they were presented with a 
patient exhibiting a symptom and asked to select the med-
ical test that they believed would be most informative to 
diagnose the patient, given the presenting symptom. The 
presenting symptom was strongly associated with either 
one or two hypotheses. Consistent with the principle of 
hypothesis-guided search, participants showed a confir-
mation-test strategy and a preference for confirmatory 
tests when only one hypothesis was highly associated with 
the presenting symptom. Alternatively, participants showed 
a preference for diagnostic tests when two hypotheses 
were associated with the presenting symptom.
These findings are consistent with the idea that diag-
nostic-test selection depends on the retrieval of alterna-
tive hypotheses into working memory. As reviewed 
above, the HyGene model identifies a number of vari-
ables that influence when more than one hypothesis will 
be generated by decision makers (e.g., amount of time 
pressure, individual differences in working memory 
capacity, and the level of cognitive load). Ongoing work 
in our laboratories is testing the effects of these variables 
on hypothesis-guided search.
Time-Based Processes Influence 
Hypothesis Generation
Another task characteristic assumed by the HyGene 
model to constrain hypothesis generation is the amount 
of time afforded to a decision maker to generate 
hypotheses. Figure 3 demonstrates the influence of time 
pressure on the behavior of the HyGene model, whereby 
greater time pressure results in the generation of fewer 
hypotheses, causing excessive probability judgments and 
increased subadditivity. In other words, if you have to 
make decisions more quickly, the model predicts that 
you will not consider as many hypotheses and that, as a 
result, you will think each possible explanation you have 
generated is more likely than it actually is.
These HyGene findings are consistent with the empiri-
cal findings of Dougherty and Hunter (2003b). Dougherty 
and Hunter (2003b) manipulated the presence or absence 
of time pressure while participants made probability 
judgments and found that participants’ judgments were 
more excessive when made under more time pressure, 
which suggests that more time pressure led to the gen-
eration of fewer hypotheses.
In hypothesis-generation tasks, data are often acquired 
serially, one after another. As a result, each datum is 
experienced in a position relative to the rest of the data. 
Although we should be unaffected by data order, on an 
intuitive level, the order in which we encounter data 
almost certainly affects the hypotheses we generate. Both 
primacy bias (early data has a larger influence than later 
data) and recency bias (later data has a larger influence 
than early data) have been demonstrated in decision 
making (Hastie & Park, 1986; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; 
Peterson & Ducharme, 1967). For instance, early data 
often have a larger influence on probability judgments 
than later data—demonstrating a primacy bias in judg-
ment (Peterson & Ducharme, 1967).
Our recent work has demonstrated similar order 
effects in peoples’ hypothesis-generation (i.e., diagnos-
tic) behavior. Lange, Thomas, and Davelaar (2012b) pre-
sented participants with one informative piece of data 
among three uninformative pieces of data sequentially, 
such that the position of the useful piece of data was 
manipulated to appear in each of four possible serial 
positions—allowing the influence of the data at each 
serial position to be measured. Later data contributed 
more to participants’ choice of diagnosis than early data, 
demonstrating a recency effect in hypothesis generation. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the HyGene model captures 
the recency trend evidenced in the data.
The speed of data acquisition also influences diagno-
sis. Lange, Thomas, Buttaccio, Illingworth, and Davelaar 
(2013) presented a sequence of five symptoms to partici-
pants and asked them to select the more likely of two 
disease hypotheses. The sequence of symptoms was 
such that the first two symptoms suggested one hypoth-
esis (Disease A) and the last two symptoms suggested the 
other hypothesis (Disease B). Under the slow rate of 
symptom presentation, a recency bias obtained in diag-
nosis, whereas under the fast rate of presentation, the 
recency bias attenuated and a primacy bias emerged.
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Fig. 3. HyGene simulation demonstrating the effects of time pres-
sure on probability judgment (left) and hypothesis generation (right). 
Adapted from “Diagnostic Hypothesis Generation and Human Judg-
ment,” by R. P. Thomas, M. R. Dougherty, A. M. Sprenger, and 
J.   Harbison, 2008, Psychological Review, 115, p. 174. Copyright 2008 
by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.
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Recent findings have suggested that a primacy bias is 
increasingly likely to obtain in hypothesis generation 
(i.e., diagnosis) as the complexity of the task increases 
(Lange, Thomas, & Davelaar, 2012a, 2012b) or as a func-
tion of increased working memory capacity (Lange, 
Davelaar, & Thomas, 2013). In sum, the same datum can 
have different impacts on which hypotheses are gener-
ated depending on where it is presented in the sequence.
Conclusions
Experimental laboratory procedures often provide clear 
options or goals for the participant—providing task struc-
ture that is often lacking in real-world domains. In the 
lab, you might be explicitly instructed to press one of two 
keys, on the basis of available data. In the real world, 
when you start to feel chest pain, there are no instruc-
tions. We suggest that the primary function of hypothesis 
generation is to impose structure on the complex and 
ill-defined problem spaces that often characterize the cir-
cumstances in which people must judge, choose, or act. 
Because physicians can generate a few good disease 
hypotheses to explain your symptoms, they can judge 
the likelihood of a diagnosis, order diagnostic medical 
tests, and select appropriate courses of treatment.
Thus, hypothesis generation serves as the critical 
bridge between peoples’ task environment and the deci-
sion  processes enabling complex and intelligent behav-
iors. Although people generate good hypotheses to 
explain patterns of data, their hypothesis generation is 
impoverished as a result of underlying memory con-
straints, which leads to systematic biases in beliefs and 
information search. The patterns of behavioral findings 
reviewed here are consistent with our computational 
model, HyGene. However, we believe that one of the 
most fruitful uses of the HyGene model will be borne out 
through optimizing the model by lifting the human con-
straints. In this context, the HyGene model may serve as 
a support tool to aid the diagnostic decision making of 
professionals by inoculating them from the biases dis-
cussed in this article and to improve the robustness of 
existing applications of artificially intelligent classification 
systems (Thomas et al., 2010).
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